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Abstract
Reliable communication imposes an upper limit on the achievable rate, namely the Shannon capacity.
Wyner’s wiretap coding, which ensures a security constraint also, in addition to reliability, results in
decrease of the achievable rate. To mitigate the loss in the secrecy rate, we propose a coding scheme
where we use sufficiently old messages as key and for this scheme prove that multiple messages are
secure with respect to (w.r.t.) all the information possessed by the eavesdropper. We also show that we
can achieve security in the strong sense. Next we consider a fading wiretap channel with full channel
state information of the eavesdropper’s channel and use our coding/decoding scheme to achieve secrecy
capacity close to the Shannon capacity of the main channel (in the ergodic sense). Finally we also
consider the case where the transmitter does not have the instantaneous information of the channel state
of the eavesdropper, but only its distribution.
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21. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of wireless communication, the issue of security has gained more importance
due to the broadcasting nature of the wireless channel. Wyner [1] proposed a coding scheme
to implement security at physical layer for a degraded wiretap channel, which is independent
of computational capacity of the adversary. The result of Wyner was generalized to a more
general broadcast channel [2]. More recently, the growth of wireless communication systems
has intensified the interest in implementing security at physical layer ([3] , [4], [5]).
There is a trade-off between the achievable rate and the level of secrecy to be achieved. In
particular, in the coding scheme which achieves the secrecy capacity in a discrete memoryless
wiretap channel, the eavesdropper (Eve) is confused with the random messages at a rate close
to Eve’s channel capacity, thus resulting in loss of transmission rate [1], [2].
Considerable progress has recently been made to improve the achievable secrecy rate of a
wiretap Channel. In [6] a wiretap channel with rate-distortion has been studied, wherein the
transmitter and the receiver have access to some shared secret key before the communication
starts. Secret key agreement between the transmitter (Alice) and the legitimate receiver (Bob)
has been studied extensively in literature ([7]-[8]). When Alice and Bob have access to a public
channel, the authors in [7] and [9] proposed a scheme to agree on a secret key about which the
adversary has less information (leakage rate goes to zero asymptotically).
In [10] the authors have considered the wiretap channel with secure rate limited feedback.
This feedback is used to agree on a secret key, and the overall secrecy rate is enhanced. Under
some conditions, the secrecy rate achieved can be equal to the main channel capacity. In [11] the
authors have considered a modulo-additive discrete memoryless wiretap channel with feedback.
The feedback is transmitted using the feed-forward channel only. The feedback signal can be
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3used as a secret key. The authors propose a coding scheme which achieves secrecy rate equal
to the main channel capacity. Wiretap channel with a shared key was studied in [12].
Fading wiretap channel was studied in [13], [14] and [15]. In [16], previously transmitted
confidential messages are stored in a secret key buffer and used in future slots to overcome the
secrecy outage in a fading wiretap channel. In this model the data to be securely transmitted
is delay sensitive. In [17] the authors also use previously transmitted bits and store in a secret
key buffer to leverage the secrecy capacity against deep fades in the main channel. The authors
prove that all messages are secure w.r.t. all the outputs of the eavesdropper. The secrecy rate is
not enhanced but prevented to decrease when the main channel is worse than the eavesdropper’s
channel. A multiplex coding technique has been proposed in [18] to enhance the secrecy capacity
to the ordinary channel capacity. The mutual information rate between Eve’s received symbols
and the (single) message transmitted is shown to decrease to zero as codeword length increases.
In most of the work cited above the security constraint used is weak secrecy where if the
message to be confidentially transmitted is W and the information that eavesdropper gets in n
channel uses is Zn, then I(W ;Zn) ≤ nǫ. From stringent security point of view, this notion is
proved to be vulnerable for leaking some useful information to the eavesdropper [4]. Maurer in
[9] provided a coding scheme combined with privacy amplification and information reconciliation
that achieves secrecy capacity (same as in the weak secrecy case) with a strong secrecy constraint,
i.e., I(W ;Zn) ≤ ǫ. There are other ways to achieve strong secrecy (see chapter 21 in [19], [20]
and [21]).
In this paper, we consider a time slotted wiretap channel. The messages transmitted in a slot
are used as a key to encrypt the message in the next slot of communication. Simultaneously, we
use the wiretap encoder for another message in the same slot, which enhances the secrecy rate.
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4We ensure that in each slot the currently transmitted message is secure with respect to (w.r.t.)
all the output that Eve has received so far.
In next part of this paper we extend this work to the wiretap channel with a secret key buffer,
where the key buffer is used to store the previously transmitted secret messages. In this scheme
we use the oldest messages stored in the key buffer as a key in a slot and then remove those
messages from the key buffer (a previous message is used as a key only once). In each slot
this key is used along with a wiretap encoder to enhance the secrecy rate. With this, not only
the current message but all the messages sent in recent past are jointly secure w.r.t. all the data
received by Eve till now. We also study a slow fading wiretap channel with the proposed coding
scheme. We show that the water-filling power control along with our coding scheme provides
the secrecy capacity close to Shannon capacity.
We also show that if resolvability based coding scheme [21] is used instead of wiretap coding
in a slot, then we can achieve secrecy capacity equal to the main channel capacity in the strong
sense also.
Rest of the paper is organised as follows. Channel model and the problem statement are
presented in Section 2. Section 3 provides our coding and decoding scheme and shows that it
can provide Shannon capacity for an AWGN wiretap channel. Section 4 extends it to a fading
wiretap channel with Eavesdropper’s channel information at the transmitter while section 5
provides the results when this information is not available at the transmitter. Section 6 concludes
this paper.
A note about the notation. Capital letters, e.g., W will denote a random variable and the
corresponding small letter w its realization. An n-length vector (A1, A2, . . . , An) will be denoted
as A. Information theoretic notation will be same as in [22].
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52. CHANNEL MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
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Fig. 1. Wiretap Channel with secret key buffer
We consider a discrete time, memoryless, degraded wiretap channel, where Alice wants to
transmit messages to Bob. We want to keep Eve (who is passively ”listening”) ignorant of the
messages (Fig. 1).
Formally, Alice wants to communicate messages W ∈ W = {1, 2, . . . , 2nRs} reliably over
the wiretap channel to Bob, while ensuring that Eve is not able to decode them, where Rs,
the secrecy capacity is defined below. W is distributed uniformly over W . At time i, Xi is
the channel input and Bob and Eve receive the channel outputs Yi and Zi respectively, where
Xi ∈ X , Yi ∈ Y , Zi ∈ Z . The transition probability matrix of the channel is p(y, z|x). The
secrecy capacity ([1])
Rs = max
p(x)
[I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z)] , (1)
is assumed > 0.
We consider the system as a time slotted system where each slot consists of M +1 minislots
and one minislot consists of n channel uses; M being a large positive integer. We are interested
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6in transmitting a sequence {Wm, m ≥ 1} of iid messages uniformly distributed over W . Let
C be the capacity of Alice-Bob channel and [x] denote the integer part of x. For simplicity,
we take C
Rs
as an integer. The message W k to be transmitted in slot k consists of one or more
messages Wm. The codeword for message W k is denoted by Xk. The corresponding received
bits by Eve are Zk. To increase the secrecy rate, the transmitter uses previous messages as keys
for transmitting the messages in a later slot.
We will denote by P
(n)
e the probability that any of the messages transmitted in a slot is not
received properly by Bob: P
(n)
e = Pr(W k 6= Ŵk) where Ŵk is the decoded message by Bob in
slot k.
For secrecy we consider the leakage rate
1
n
I(W k,W k−1, . . . ,W k−N1;Z1, . . . , Zk) (2)
in slot k where N1 is an arbitrarily large positive integer which can be chosen as a design
parameter to take into account the secrecy requirement of the application at hand 1. Then of
course we should be considering k > N1.This means that the Eve at time k is not interested in
very old messages transmitted before slot k −N1.
Definition 2.1. Rate R is achievable if there are coding-decoding schemes for each n such that
P
(n)
e → 0 and 1nI(W k, . . . ,W k−N1;Z1, . . . , Zk) → 0 as n → ∞, where N1 is an arbitrarily
large fixed constant.
In the following we explain our coding scheme. The message W k transmitted in slot k is
1One motivation for this is the law in various countries where old secret documents are declassified after a certain number of
years.
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7stored in a key buffer (of infinite length) for later use as a key. After certain bits from the key
buffer are used as a key for data transmission, those bits are discarded from the key buffer, not
to be used again. Let Bk be the number of bits in the key buffer at the beginning of slot k. Let
Rk be the number of key bits used in slot k from the key buffer. Then
Bk+1 = Bk + |W k| −Rk (3)
where |W k| denotes the number of bits in W k. Now we explain the coding-decoding scheme
used in this paper.
A. Encoder:
To transmit message W k in slot k, the encoder has two parts
fs :W → X
n, fd :W
M ×K → X nM , (4)
where K is the set of secret keys generated and fs is the wiretap encoder, as in [1]. We use the
following encoder for fd: Take binary version of the message and XOR with the binary version
of the key. Encode the resulting encrypted message with an optimal usual channel encoder (e.g.,
an efficient LDPC code).
Assume B0 = 0. The case of B0 > 0 can be easily handled in the same way. In the first slot
message W 1 = W1, encoded using the wiretap coding only is transmitted (we use only the first
minislot, see Fig. 2) . At the end of slot 1, nRs bits of this message are stored in the key buffer.
Thus B1 = Rsn. In slot 2, message W 2 consisting of two messages (W 21,W 22) = (W2,W3) are
transmitted. W2 is transmitted via wiretap coding and W3 uses W 1 as a key and the encrypted
message W 1 ⊕W3 is transmitted via a usual capacity achieving channel code. At the end of
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8slot 2, Rsn bits of W 1 are removed from the key buffer and 2Rsn bits of W 2 are stored in the
key buffer. Since Bob is able to decode W 1 with a large probability, but not Eve, W 1 can be an
effective key in slot 2. In slot 3, message W 3 consisting of 3 messages from the source message
sequence are transmitted: one message in the first mini slot denoted as W3,1 via wiretap coding
and two messages denoted together as W 3,2 via encryption with message W 2 as key bits. In any
mini-slot we can transmit upto C/Rs messages via encryption with a key. This is because we
cannot transmit reliably at a rate higher than Bob’s capacity C. Thus, the maximum number of
messages that can be transmitted in a slot is 1 + C
Rs
M , M1. Once we reach this limit, from
then onwards M1 messages will be transmitted in a slot providing the achievable rate
Rs+CM
M+1
which can be made as close to C as we wish by making M arbitrarily large.
Consequently, in slot k ≤ M1, k messages from the source message stream are transmitted,
(k−1)Rsn bits from the key buffer are removed in the beginning of slot k and kRsn bits are added
to the key buffer at the end of slot k. The overall message is denoted by W k =
(
W k,1,W k,2
)
with W k,1 consisting of one source message transmitted via wiretap coding and W k,2 consisting
of k − 1 messages transmitted via the secret key. From slot M1 onwards M1 messages are
transmitted in the above mentioned fashion.
We use the key buffer as a first in first out (FIFO) queue, i.e., at any time the oldest key bits
in the buffer are used first. Also Bk →∞ as k →∞.
Decoder
We have a secret key buffer at Bob’s decoder also that is used in the same way as at the
transmitter. The confidential messages decoded by the decoder are stored in this buffer. For
decoding at Bob, in slot 1 the usual wiretap decoder is used (say, a joint-typicality decoder).
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Fig. 2. Coding Scheme to achieve Shannon Capacity in Wiretap Channel
From slot 2 onwards, for the first mini-slot, we use the wiretap decoder while for the rest of the
mini-slots, we use the channel decoder (corresponding to the channel encoder used) and then
XOR the decoded message with the key used.
The above coding-decoding schemes ensure that P
(n)
e → 0 as n → ∞. There is a small
issue of error propagation due to using the previous message as key: Let ǫn be the message
error probability for the wiretap encoder and let δn be the message error probability due to the
channel encoder for W k. Then ǫn → 0 and δn → 0 as n → ∞. For the kth slot, we have
P (W k 6= Ŵk) ≤ Pr(Error in decoding W k1) + Pr(Error in decoding W k2) + Pr(Error in
decoding W k−1) ≤ kǫn + (k − 1)δn. Thus the error increases with k. But restarting (as in slot
1) after some large k slots as in slot 1 (i.e., again start with one message in the first minislot
and no message in the rest of the slot) will ensure that P (W k 6= Ŵk)→ 0 as n→∞.
In the rest of the paper we show that our coding scheme provides an achievable rate with the
above secrecy criterion as close to C as needed, for all k large enough. We also note that the
following proof is valid for N1 > 1. The proof for N1 = 1 is different from the proposed proof
and one can refer to [23] for details of the proof. We will denote the codeword Xk = (Xk,1, Xk,2)
and Zk = (Zk,1, Zk,2) for the data received by Eve in the first part and the second part of slot
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10
k.
3. CAPACITY OF WIRETAP CHANNEL
Theorem 3.1. The secrecy capacity of our coding-decoding scheme is C and it satisfies (2) for
any N1 ≥ 0, for all k large enough.
Proof : As mentioned in the last section, by using our coding-decoding scheme, using wiretap
coding and secure key, in any slot k, Bob is able to decode the message W k with probability
P
(n)
e → 0 as n→∞.
FixN1 ≥ 0 and a small ǫ > 0. Due to wiretap coding, we can choose n such that I(W k,1;Zk,1) ≤
nǫ for all k ≥ 1. Since the key buffer Bk → ∞, we use the oldest key bits in the buffer first
and in any slot do not use more than MC key bits, after sometime (say N2 slots) for all
k ≥ N2 we will be using key bits only from the messages W 1,W 2, . . . ,W k−N1−1 for messages
W k,W k−1, . . . ,W k−N1 . Furthermore,
I(W k,W k−1, . . . ,W k−N1;Z1, . . . , Zk)
= I(W k,1,W k−1,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1;Z1, . . . , Zk)
+ I(W k,2, . . . ,W k−N1,2;Z1, . . . , Zk|W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1). (5)
We show in Lemma 1 that
I(W k,1,W k−1,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1;Z1, . . . , Zk) ≤ (N1 + 1)nǫ, (6)
and in Lemma 2 that
DRAFT September 12, 2018
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I(W k,2, . . . ,W k−N1,2;Z1, . . . , Zk|W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1) = N1ǫ. (7)
From (5), (6) and (7)
1
n
I(W k,W k−1, . . . ,W k−N1 ;Z1, . . . , Zk) ≤ (2N1 + 1)ǫ. (8)
By fixing N1, we can take ǫ small enough such that (N1 +1)ǫ is less than any desired value.

So far we have been considering an infinite buffer system. But an actual system will have a
finite buffer. Now we compute the key buffer length needed for our system.
If we fix the probability of error for Bob and the upper bound on equivocation, then we can
get the code length n needed. Also, from the secrecy requirement, we can fix N1. Once n and
N1 are fixed, to ensure that eventually, in slot k we will use a key from messages before time
k − N1, the key buffer size should be ≥ CMN1n bits. Also, since in each slot, the key buffer
length increases by nRs bits, the key buffer will have at least CMN1n bits after slot
CMN1
Rs
. In
the finite buffer case eventually key buffer will overflow. We should loose only the latest bits
arriving in any slot (not the bits already stored).
We can obtain Shannon capacity even with strong secrecy. For this instead of using the usual
wiretap coding of Wyner in the first minislot of each slot we use the resolvability based coding
scheme [21]. Then I(W k,1;Zk,1) ≤ ǫ instead of I(W k,1;Zk,1) ≤ nǫ for n large enough. Then
from proof of Theorem 1, our coding-decoding scheme provides
I(W k, . . . ,W k−N1;Z1, . . . , Zk) ≤ ǫ. (9)
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4. AWGN SLOW FADING CHANNEL
We consider a slow flat fading AWGN channel (Fig. 1), where the channel gains in a slot are
constant. The channel outputs are,
Yi =
∼
H Xi +N1i, (10)
Zi =
∼
G Xi +N2i, (11)
where Xi is the channel input, {N1i} and {N2i} are independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.)
sequences independent of each other and {Xi} with distributions N (0, σ21) and N (0, σ
2
2) respec-
tively, and N (a, b) denotes Gaussian distribution with mean a and variance b. Also
∼
H and
∼
G are
the channel gains to Bob and Eve respectively in the given slot. Let H = |
∼
H|2 and G = |
∼
G|2.
The channel gains Hk and Gk in slot k are constant and sequences {Hk, k ≥ 0} and {Gk, k ≥
0} are iid and independent of each other. We assume that (Hk, Gk) is known at the transmitter
and Bob at the beginning of slot k. The notation and assumptions are same as in Section 3.
Power P (Hk, Gk) is used in slot k for transmission. There is an average power constraint,
lim sup
k→∞
1
k
k∑
m=1
E [P (Hk, Gk)] ≤ P. (12)
Given Hk, Gk, and Bk at the beginning of slot k, Alice needs to decide on P (Hk, Gk) and
Rk such that the resulting average transmission rate lim supk→∞
1
k
∑k
l=1 rl is maximized subject
to (12), (2) and P ne → 0, where rk is the transmission rate in slot k. We compute this capacity
for P (Hk > Gk) > 0; otherwise, the capacity is zero. At the end of slot k, n(M + 1)rk , rk
bits are stored in the key buffer for later use as a key while Rk bits have been removed. Thus,
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the buffer size evolves as,
Bk+1 = Bk + rk − Rk. (13)
For convenience, we define
C(P (H,G)) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
HP (H,G)
σ21
)
, (14)
and
Ce(P (H,G)) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
GP (H,G)
σ22
)
, (15)
where P (H,G) is the power used when the channel gains are H and G. Unlike Sections II
and III where initial messages W are with cardinality 2nRs , we use adaptive coding and power
control. Then, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. The secrecy rate
Cs = EH [C(P (H))] (16)
is achievable if Pr(Hk > Gk) > 0, where P (H) = P (H,G) is the water-filling power policy
for Alice → Bob channel.
Proof: We follow the coding-decoding scheme of Section-3 with the following change to
account of the fading.
Each slot has M + 1 mini-slots. We fix a power control policy P (H,G) satisfying average
power constraint. We transmit for the first time when Hk > Gk and use wiretap coding in all
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the (M + 1) minislots. We store all the transmitted bits in the key buffer also.
From next slot onwards, we use the first mini-slot for wiretap coding (if Hk > Gk) and rest of
the mini-slots for transmission via secret key (if Hk ≤ Gk use onlyM minislots for transmission
with secret key in slot k and do not use the first minislot, withRk = min (Bk,MC(P (Hk, Gk))n).
In every slot we remove Rk bits and add rk ≥ Rk bits to the key buffer. Since Pr (Hk > Gk) > 0,
Pr(rk > Rk) > 0. Thus Bk ↑ ∞ a.s. and eventually, in every slot we will transmit in the first
mini-slot at rate
[C (P (Hk, Gk))− Ce (P (Hk, Gk))]
+
(17)
and in the rest of the mini-slots at rate C (P (Hk, Gk)) with arbitrarily large probability.
The average rate in a slot can be made as close to C (P (Hk, Gk)) as we wish by making M
large enough. Thus, the rate for this coding scheme is maximized by water filling.
Now we want to ensure that for k large enough, for messages
(
W k,W k−1, . . . ,W k−N1
)
we
use only keys from
(
W 1, . . . ,W k−N1−1
)
. It can be ensured if we do not use more than M
key bits in a slot and from k − N1 onward the key queue length ≥ MN1 bits, where the
constant M can be chosen arbitrarily large. Thus we modify the above scheme such that we
use min
(
Bk,M, nMC(P (Hk))
)
key bits in a slot instead of min(Bk, nMC(P (Hk))) bits. By
making M as large as needed, we can get arbitrarily close to the water filling rate.
Strong secrecy can be achieved as for the non-fading case in Section-3. Also, to attain the
required reliability and secrecy, the key buffer length required can be obtained as in Section 3
by using M (defined in the proof of Theorem 2).
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5. FADING WIRE-TAP WITH NO CSI OF EAVESDROPPER
In this section we assume that the transmitter knows only the channel state of Bob at time k
but not Gk, the channel state of Eve. This is more realistic because Eve is a passive listener. Now
we modify our fading model. Instead of (Hk, Gk) being constant during a slot (slow fading),
the coherence time of (Hk, Gk) is much smaller than the duration n of a minislot. Then we
can use the coding-decoding scheme of [13] in the first minislot with secrecy rate Rs and
I(W k,1;Z1, . . . , Zk) ≤ nǫ, where
Rs =
1
2
EH,G
{[
log
(
1 +
HP (H)
σ21
)
− log
(
1 +
GP (H)
σ22
)]+}
. (18)
Now we have the following proposition
Proposition 5.1. Secrecy capacity equal to the main channel capacity without CSI of Eve at the
transmitter
C =
1
2
EH
[
log
(
1 +
HP (H)
σ21
)]
(19)
is achievable subject to power constraint EH [P (H)] ≤ P¯ , where P (H) is the waterfilling policy.
Proof: Since each mini-slot is of long duration compared to the coherence time of the fading
process (Hk, Gk), the coding scheme of [13] can be used without the CSI of Eve in the first
minislot of each slot. This can achieve secrecy capacity
Cs = EH,G
[
1
2
log
(
1 +HP (H)/σ21
1 +GP (H)/σ22
)+]
(20)
subject to the power constraint EH,G [P (H)] ≤ P¯ , with I(W k;Zk) ≤ nǫ. Now we can use the
coding-decoding scheme of Section 3 to achieve the secrecy capacity equal to the main channel
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capacity
C =
1
2
EH
[
log
(
1 +
HP (H)
σ21
)]
. (21)
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have achieved secrecy rate equal to the main channel capacity of a wiretap
channel by using the previous secret messages as a key for transmitting the current message. We
have shown that not only the current message being transmitted, but all messages transmitted in
last N1 slots are secure w.r.t. all the outputs of the eavesdropper till now, where N1 can be taken
arbitrarily large. We have extended this result to fading wiretap channels when CSI of Eve may
or may not be available to the transmitter. The optimal power control is water filling itself.
7. APPENDICES
8. PROOFS OF LEMMAS
Lemma 1: The following holds
I(W k,1,W k−1,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1;Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk) ≤ (N1 + 1)nǫ. (22)
Proof : We have,
I(W k,1,W k−1,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1;Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk)
= I(W k,1;Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk)
+ I(W k−1,1;Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk|W k,1) + . . .+
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+ I(W k−N1,1;Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk|W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1+1,1). (23)
But
I(W k,1;Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk)
= I(W k,1;Zk,1) + I(W k,1;Z1, . . . , Zk−1, Zk,2|Zk,1)
≤ nǫ+ 0, (24)
because (Z1, . . . , Zk−1, Zk,2) ⊥ (Zk,1,W k,1), where X ⊥ Y denotes that random variable X is
independent of Y .
Next consider
I(W k−1,1;Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk|W k,1)
= I(W k−1,1;Zk−1,1|W k,1)
+ I(W k−1,1; (Z1, . . . , Zk)− Zk−1,1|W k,1, Zk−1,1), (25)
where (Z1, . . . , Zk)− Zk−1,1 denotes the sequence (Z1, . . . , Zk) without Zk−1,1. However,
I(W k−1,1;Zk−1,1|W k,1)
= I(W k−1,1;Zk−1,1) ≤ nǫ. (26)
Also, because (Z1, . . . , Zk−2) is independent of (W k−1,1,W k,1, Zk−1,1),
I(W k−1,1; (Z1, . . . , Zk)− Zk−1,1|W k,1, Zk−1,1)
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= I(W k−1,1;Z1, . . . , Zk−2|W k,1, Zk−1,1)
+ I(W k−1,1;Zk, Zk−1,2|W k,1, Zk−1,1, Z1, . . . Zk−2) (27)
(a)
= 0 + I(W k−1,1;Zk,1|W k,1, Zk−1,1, Z1, . . . Zk−2)
+ I(W k−1,1;Zk,2, Zk−1,2|W k,1, Zk−1,1, Z1, . . . Zk−2, Zk,1). (28)
Furthermore, since (W k−1,1,W k,1, Zk,1, Zk−1,1) ⊥ (Z1, . . . , Zk−2) we have
I(W k−1,1;Zk,1|W k,1, Zk−1,1, Z1, . . . , Zk−2)
= I(W k−1;Zk,1|W k,1, Zk−1,1). (29)
Using the fact that (W k−1, Zk−1,1) ⊥ (W k,1, Zk,1) we can directly show that the right side equals
zero.
Let A denote the indices of the slots in which messages are transmitted which are used as
keys for transmitting W k,2 and W k−1,2. Since
(Zk,2, Zk−1,2)↔ (W k−1,1,WA)
↔ (W k,1, Zk−1,1, Zk,1, Z1, . . . , Zk−2), (30)
where X ↔ Y ↔ Z denotes that {X, Y, Z} forms a Markov chain, we have
I(W k−1,1;Zk,2, Zk−1,2|W k,1, Zk−1,1, Z1, . . . , Zk−2, Zk,1)
≤ I(W k−1,1,WA;Zk,2, Zk−1,2|W k,1, Zk−1,1,
Z1, . . . , Zk−2, Zk,1)
DRAFT September 12, 2018
19
(a)
≤ I(W k−1,1,WA;Zk,2, Zk−1,2)
(31)
≤ I(W k−1,1;Zk,2, Zk−1,2) + I(WA;Zk,2, Zk−1,2|W k−1,1)
(b)
= 0 + I(WA;Zk,2, Zk−1,2)
(c)
= 0, (32)
where (a) follows from (30), (b) follows since (W k−1,1, Zk−1,1) ⊥ (WA, Zk,2, Zk−1,2) and (c)
follows since WA ⊥ Zk,2, Zk−1,2.
From (25), (26), (29), (32),
I(W k−1,1;Z1, Z2, . . . , Zk|W k,1) ≤ nǫ. (33)
We can similarly show that the other terms on the right side of (5) are also upper bounded
by nǫ. This proves the lemma.
Lemma 2: The following holds
I(W k,2,W k−1,2, . . .W k−N1,2;Z1, . . . , Zk|W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1) ≤ N1nǫ. (34)
Proof: We have
I(W k,2, . . . ,W k−N1,2;Z1, . . . , Zk|W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1)
= I(W k,2, . . . ,W k−N1,2;Z1, . . . , Zk−N1−1|W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1)
+ I(W k,2, , . . . ,W k−N1,2;Zk−N1, . . . , Zk|W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1, Z1, . . . , Zk−N1−1). (35)
Since W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1 is independent of W k,2, . . . ,W k−N1,2, Z1, . . . , Zk−N1−1, the first
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term on the right equals
I(W k,2,W k−1,2, . . . ,W k−N1,2;Z1, . . . , Zk−N1−1) = 0. (36)
The second term in the RHS of (35)
= I(W k,2, . . . ,W k−N1,2;Zk−N1 , . . . , Zk|W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1, Z1, . . . , Zk−N1−1)
= I(W k,2, . . . ,W k−N1,2;Zk−N1,1, . . . Zk,1|W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1, Z1, . . . , Zk−N1−1)
+ I(W k,2,W k−1,2, . . . ,W k−N1,2;Zk−N1,2, . . . , Zk,2|W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1,
Z1, . . . , Zk−N1−1, Zk−N1,1, . . . , Zk,1). (37)
The first term on the right is zero because (W k,2,W k−1,2, . . . ,W k−N1,2) is independent of
(Zk,1,. . .,Zk−N1,1), (W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1) and Z1,. . . Zk−N1−1. Also since (W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1)
and (Zk,1, . . . , Zk−N1,1) are independent of the other random variables in the second term on
the right side, this term equals
I(W k,2,W k−1,2, . . . ,W k−N1,2;Zk,2, . . . , Zk−N1,2|Z1, . . . , Zk−N1−1). (38)
For convenience we denote it as I(Ŵ2; Ẑ2|Ẑ1) with Ŵ2, Ẑ2, Ẑ1 denoting the respective sequences
of random variables. Since
I(Ŵ2; Ẑ1, Ẑ2) = I(Ŵ2; Ẑ1) + I(Ŵ2; Ẑ2|Ẑ1)
= I(Ŵ2; Ẑ2) + I(Ŵ2; Ẑ1|Ẑ2), (39)
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and we have
I(Ŵ2, Ẑ1) = 0 = I(Ŵ2; Ẑ2), (40)
and
Ẑ1 ↔ (Ŵ1, ŴA, Ŵ2)↔ Ẑ2, (41)
where Ŵ1 = (W k,1, . . . ,W k−N1,1), we get
I(Ŵ2; Ẑ2|Ẑ1)
(a)
= I(Ŵ2; Ẑ1|Ẑ2)
≤ I(Ŵ1, Ŵ2, ŴA; Ẑ1|Ẑ2)
(b)
≤ I(Ŵ1, Ŵ2, ŴA; Ẑ1)
= I(Ŵ1; Ẑ1) + I(Ŵ2, ŴA; Ẑ1|Ŵ1)
(c)
= 0 + I(Ŵ2, ŴA; Ẑ1)
= I(ŴA; Ẑ1) + I(Ŵ2; Ẑ1|ŴA)
(d)
≤ N1nǫ+ 0 = N1nǫ, (42)
where (a) follow from (40), (b) follows from (41) (c) follows from Ŵ1 ⊥ (Ŵ2, ŴA, Ẑ1), (d)
follows from wiretap coding and the fact that the set A will not have larger cardinality than N1,
and Ŵ2 ⊥ (Ẑ1, ŴA).
Therefore
I(Ŵ2; Ẑ2|Ẑ1) ≤ N1nǫ. (43)
From (36), (37) and (43), we get the lemma.
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